Police Raids & Courtroom Moments That Tested VPN ‘No-Logs’ Claims

A running list of real-world law-enforcement actions against VPNs — from office raids and server seizures to court cases — and what each one actually proved.
Police Raids & Courtroom Moments That Tested VPN ‘No-Logs’ Claims

🧑‍⚖️ When Cops Knock: Real Cases Where VPN Privacy Was Put to the Test

Marketers make claims. Raids, seizures, and subpoenas tell the truth.

Below is a curated, fact-checked roundup of notable police actions and legal cases involving VPNs. For each entry, we note what happened, what investigators got (or didn’t), and why it matters to anyone choosing a VPN.

Related reading: Tom’s Guide covered Windscribe’s recent court win — a good example of how no-logs can matter in practice. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0}


🚨 Raids & Seizures That (Mostly) Backed Up No-Logs

  • Mullvad (Sweden, 2023) — Swedish NOA officers arrived with a search warrant to seize computers “with customer data.” Mullvad demonstrated it stores none; police left without taking anything. Later, prosecutors confirmed the action was part of international cooperation with Germany. Outcome: No customer data obtained. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}

  • ExpressVPN (Turkey, 2017) — Turkish investigators seized an on-prem server tied to the Andrei Karlov assassination probe. The server contained no logs useful to the case, aligning with ExpressVPN’s policy. Outcome: No user data found. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}

  • Perfect Privacy (Netherlands, 2016) — Dutch police seized two Rotterdam servers from the Swiss-based provider during an investigation. Outcome: Provider stated it keeps no logs; no evidence surfaced that user data was exposed. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}


  • Windscribe (Greece, 2023–2025) — Prosecutors alleged a Windscribe IP was used to compromise a Greek host and send mass emails. Windscribe argued it had no identifying logs to hand over. Outcome: Case dismissed in 2025; provider says no-logs left investigators with nothing linking a person. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}

  • Private Internet Access — PIA (USA, 2016; noted again 2018) — In a Florida FBI case, a subpoena to PIA returned no useful data beyond a U.S. region for a shared IP cluster, consistent with its no-logs policy; later cases likewise referenced PIA’s inability to identify users. Outcome: Court records corroborated the no-logs claim. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

  • OVPN (Sweden, 2020) — Anti-piracy groups tried to compel OVPN to identify a user allegedly tied to Pirate Bay. Outcome: Court sided with OVPN; it could not identify the user due to no logging.


⚠️ Cases That Revealed Logs (or Operational Gaps)

  • HideMyAss / HMA (UK/US, 2011) — In the LulzSec/Sony Pictures case, HMA complied with a UK court order and provided connection logs that helped identify Cody Kretsinger (“recursion”). Outcome: Defendant arrested and later sentenced in U.S. federal court. :contentReference[oaicite:7]{index=7}

  • PureVPN (US, 2017) — In a Massachusetts cyberstalking case (Ryan Lin), FBI filings describe PureVPN records linking activity across IPs and accounts. Outcome: Logs aided identification; widely reported as contradicting “no-logs” marketing at the time. :contentReference[oaicite:8]{index=8}

  • IPVanish (US, 2016; surfaced 2018) — Court papers show IPVanish handed over connection data to DHS in a criminal investigation, despite “no-logs” claims under prior ownership. (The company later changed hands and policies.) Outcome: Data assisted law enforcement; provider says practices have since changed. :contentReference[oaicite:9]{index=9}

  • Windscribe (Ukraine server seizure, 2021 — ops security lesson) — Ukrainian authorities seized two unencrypted OpenVPN servers. A private key on disk meant traffic could be intercepted under narrow conditions (e.g., users with custom configs). Outcome: Windscribe revamped infrastructure; incident highlights why disk encryption and key handling matter. :contentReference[oaicite:10]{index=10}


🕳️ “Bulletproof” VPNs Used by Cybercrime — Full Takedowns

These aren’t mainstream consumer VPNs, but they show how far police will go when a VPN markets to criminals:

  • Safe-Inet (Operation Nova, 2020) — Joint U.S./EU action seized infrastructure of a VPN advertised to ransomware groups. Outcome: Service taken down. :contentReference[oaicite:11]{index=11}

  • DoubleVPN (2021) — Dutch-led, Europol-coordinated action seized servers, logs, and account info from a VPN promoted on underground forums. Outcome: Domains and back-end infrastructure seized across multiple countries. :contentReference[oaicite:12]{index=12}


🧭 What These Cases Actually Tell You

  1. “No-logs” can be real — but it’s proven by outcomes, not websites. When servers or offices were seized (ExpressVPN, Mullvad, Perfect Privacy), investigators left empty-handed. Courts have also validated providers like OVPN and PIA when they couldn’t identify users. :contentReference[oaicite:13]{index=13}

  2. Marketing ≠ practice. Cases with HMA, PureVPN, and IPVanish show that connection metadata has existed and been handed over, sometimes contradicting prior claims. Ownership changes and audits can improve things, but history matters. :contentReference[oaicite:14]{index=14}

  3. Ops security is part of privacy. Even if a provider intends to keep no logs, poor server encryption or key management (Windscribe 2021) can create exposure if hardware is seized. :contentReference[oaicite:15]{index=15}

  4. Jurisdiction & hosting choices matter. Several seizures happened via data centers rather than the VPN company itself, underscoring risks when providers rely on third-party hosts without full-disk encryption and tamper-evident design. :contentReference[oaicite:16]{index=16}


📝 Quick Reference: Notable Incidents

Year Provider / Service Country (action) What happened Takeaway
2011 HMA (HideMyAss) UK/US Logs provided in LulzSec case; FBI arrest & sentencing followed Connection logs existed; complied with order :contentReference[oaicite:17]{index=17}
2016 Perfect Privacy Netherlands Two servers seized in Rotterdam No user data shown to be exposed; reinforced no-logs claim :contentReference[oaicite:18]{index=18}
2016 PIA USA Subpoena returned no identifying info in FBI case Court docs backed no-logs posture :contentReference[oaicite:19]{index=19}
2017 ExpressVPN Turkey Server seized in Karlov probe; no logs found Real-world validation of no-logs :contentReference[oaicite:20]{index=20}
2017 PureVPN USA FBI affidavit cites provider records tying activity to user Logs aided ID; marketing scrutiny followed :contentReference[oaicite:21]{index=21}
2016→2018 IPVanish USA DHS case revealed connection data handed over under prior ownership Policy/ownership changes later; history noted :contentReference[oaicite:22]{index=22}
2020 OVPN Sweden Court declined to compel identification in Pirate Bay matter Court says provider couldn’t ID due to no logging
2021 Windscribe (UA) Ukraine Unencrypted servers seized; key could enable targeted interception under conditions Provider reworked infra; ops security matters :contentReference[oaicite:24]{index=24}
2023 Mullvad Sweden Police arrived with warrant; left with nothing No customer data to seize :contentReference[oaicite:25]{index=25}
2020–2021 Safe-Inet / DoubleVPN EU/US “Bulletproof” VPNs dismantled; servers/logs seized Law enforcement will fully take down crime-focused VPNs :contentReference[oaicite:26]{index=26}

🧠 How to Use This When Picking a VPN

  • Look for third-party audits and real-world tests (court references, seizures with no data).
  • Prefer providers with diskless/RAM-only servers and strong key management.
  • Check transparency reports and incident write-ups — see how candid the provider is after trouble.
  • Weigh jurisdiction, but remember: implementation beats marketing.

Sources & Further Reading

  • Windscribe Greek case explainer (Tom’s Guide) and provider statement. :contentReference[oaicite:27]{index=27}
  • Mullvad search-warrant posts; external coverage (Verge, TechRadar). :contentReference[oaicite:28]{index=28}
  • ExpressVPN Turkey seizure coverage. :contentReference[oaicite:29]{index=29}
  • PIA “no-logs tested” court article. :contentReference[oaicite:30]{index=30}
  • OVPN court updates.
  • HMA/LulzSec reporting and FBI press releases. :contentReference[oaicite:32]{index=32}
  • PureVPN Ryan Lin filings and reporting. :contentReference[oaicite:33]{index=33}
  • Perfect Privacy server seizures in NL. :contentReference[oaicite:34]{index=34}
  • DoubleVPN & Safe-Inet takedowns. :contentReference[oaicite:35]{index=35}